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Nine Concrete Ways to Curtail 
the Economic War among the States
Greg LeRoy
Good Jobs First
More than 10 years ago I wrote a book titled No More Candy Store: 
States and Cities Making Job Subsidies Accountable (LeRoy 1994), 
which likened the choices that many companies faced between all of 
the “sweet” job subsidy deals offered by competing states and cities 
to a kid in a candy shop. Too often a mess resulted—very few jobs 
were created and/or the company went out of business or relocated. One 
could get very depressed thinking about how hard it will be to solve 
this crazy “candy store” mess. A lot of people with huge fi nancial self-
interests are tied to the status quo: footloose corporations, site location 
consultants, accounting fi rms and tax consultants, industrial real estate 
brokers, mayors, governors, and building contractors.
Given how deeply entrenched this wasteful system has become, 
only an organizing approach to the problem can undo it. By this I mean 
reforms that bring everyday taxpayers back into the process, that ac-
tively enable and encourage grassroots groups like community organi-
zations, environmentalists and labor unions, as well as journalists and 
government watchdogs, to wade in. With all due respect to some who 
have proposed sweeping lawsuits or legislation that I would call “silver 
bullets,” such ideas don’t stand a chance against a problem so deeply 
embedded as this one.1 
Reforms, of course, involve legislation. Some new laws are neces-
sary, but they should be simple laws based on common sense that are 
strongly enforced—laws with clear intentions that courts cannot per-
vert. Don’t forget, today’s candy store mess is a dream for lawyers and 
accountants, since it consists of so many hundreds of convoluted laws 
and tax gimmicks. 
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SUNSHINE: THE BEST ANTISEPTIC
The fi rst two necessary reforms involve disclosure. Taxpayers need 
to see how much money each company received in tax breaks and oth-
er subsidies—especially corporate income tax breaks that are usually 
undisclosed.
This disclosure is the cornerstone of reform. Think about other ma-
jor reforms the United States has enacted in the past 40 years. 
•  When community groups alleged that banks were discriminat-
ing against minorities or those living in older neighborhoods by 
denying loans to worthy borrowers because of their race or their 
address, they demanded and won the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act. That law requires banks to disclose the number and dollar 
value of all their housing loans every year, by census tract. The 
data revealed blatant discrimination, and prompted Congress to 
pass the Community Reinvestment Act, which has enabled hun-
dreds of community groups to win billions of dollars for neigh-
borhood revitalization from many of the nation’s largest banks. 
•  When community groups and labor unions alleged that chemical 
factories and other big polluters were endangering their health 
with toxic emissions, they demanded and won the Toxic Right 
to Know law, which requires companies to disclose the content 
and quantity of all emissions. Using that data, coalitions have 
won hundreds of agreements with companies to reduce hazard-
ous emissions and otherwise improve local safety.
•  During Watergate, when citizens become frustrated with reports 
of corruption, they demanded to know who was giving money—
and how much—to politicians. The resulting disclosure produces 
data compiled by the Federal Elections Commission. And while 
many people call our campaign fi nance system “legalized cor-
ruption,” at least we know who bankrolls whom. If we did not 
have that information, none of the more recent campaign fi nance 
laws, like McCain-Feingold, could have taken hold.
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REFORM 1: STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
SUBSIDY DISCLOSURE
By disclosure, I mean annual, company-specifi c, public reporting 
of costs and benefi ts. How much did each company get? Which subsidy 
program did the money come from? What did the company do with the 
money? How many jobs did it create? How well do the jobs pay? Do 
they provide health care?
Seems pretty simple, doesn’t it? Every state and city should be able 
to disclose such basic facts. But as we’ve seen in so many horror sto-
ries, most governors and mayors aren’t watching the store. Some even 
pretend to perform cost-benefi t analysis by adding up their own press 
releases.
Twelve states have already enacted some form of economic devel-
opment subsidy disclosure (Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, 
Washington State, and West Virginia). These states vary a lot in terms 
of the quality and completeness of their disclosure, but we certainly 
have enough experience now to talk about what works best. (You can 
see details about each state’s disclosure law in Chapter 3 of our research 
manual, No More Secret Candy Store, at www.goodjobsfi rst.org.)
Any state can be investigated, regardless of whether it’s on the list. 
You can normally get quite a bit of information about deals in a state, 
especially if you are willing to wage a paper war under the state’s Open 
Records Act or Freedom of Information Act. With a lot of time and per-
sistence (and possibly some money for processing charges), you might 
be able to cobble together as much information as you could get quickly 
for free in a state with disclosure. But taxpayers shouldn’t have to wage 
a costly paper war with bureaucrats; they should be able to quickly and 
easily fi nd out where their economic development money is going and 
whether their taxpayer investments are paying off. That’s what I mean 
by disclosure. Indeed, the information should be on the Web, just like it 
already is in some states.
Let’s look at an example. Minnesota is one of my favorite disclo-
sure states. Although the Gopher State’s law does not cover corporate 
income tax breaks, it does cover lots of other subsidies—and the data 
are on the Web! Since its original law was passed in 1995 and improved 
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twice later, hundreds of Minnesota deals have been disclosed every year. 
Figure 8.1 shows an example of one deal, in Caledonia, Minnesota.
So here we have a tax increment fi nancing deal (box 11) worth 
$275,515 (box 16) to create one new job (box 17) at Dairy Queen (box 
12) paying $4.50 an hour (box 18). Now, I don’t know how many ice 
cream cones they sell in Caledonia in February, I mean, I really hope 
that’s a full-year job. Health care? I doubt it. I suppose we should be 
grateful that the company is reporting an actual wage of $5.15 an hour, 
but then, that may be due to the federal minimum wage getting raised 
in the interim. But isn’t that an awfully big subsidy for a poverty-wage 
job? Until the state enacted disclosure, Minnesotans didn’t know there 
were deals like this happening.
Notice how unbureaucratic this disclosure system is. A city staff 
person fi lls in the top half of the form (based on its fi les from the origi-
nal deal), then she calls the company and asks about jobs created and 
wages paid. Then she mails the form to the state Department of Em-
ployment and Economic Development (DEED) in St. Paul, and DEED 
scans the forms and posts them on its Web site.
Of course, I prefer a state’s disclosure system to include corporate 
income tax breaks, and some already do. West Virginia has been report-
ing on every company that claims any major kind of corporate income 
tax credit for more than a dozen years. Maine has been disclosing three 
since it enacted disclosure in 1998. North Carolina enacted disclosure 
in 2002; you can see company-specifi c data at www.dor.state.nc.us/
publications/williamslee.html.
More information on the disclosure form would be helpful. Will 
these jobs be accessible by public transportation? Does this deal in-
volve a relocation? If so, from where and to where? Were the jobs ac-
cessible by public transportation before? Will they be accessible after 
the relocation? Otherwise, how do we know if the jobs are even avail-
able to low-income workers who cannot afford a car?
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An actual disclosure 
form from Minnesota: a 
company got a TIF (box 
11) worth $275,515 
(16) to create 1 new job 
(17) at Dairy Queen 
(12) paying $4.50 an 
hour (18)
Figure 8.1  1998 Minnesota Business Assistance Form
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REFORM 2: DISCLOSURE TO CORPORATE 
SHAREHOLDERS OF STATE TAXES PAID
Publicly traded companies (those that are listed on stock exchanges) 
already disclose how much they pay in federal income tax each year, in 
their annual reports and Forms 10-K. They also already disclose how 
much they pay in all state and local taxes, but they are only required to 
disclose the total from all 50 states in one aggregate number. So, for 
instance, when looking at General Motors’ Form 10-K, it is not possible 
to determine how much the company’s taxes have gone up or down in 
Michigan the past dozen years.
The solution would be simple: require publicly traded companies to 
include a 50-state matrix in their Form 10-Ks showing how much tax 
they paid in each state. Breaking it down into three categories in each 
state would be best: income tax; property tax; and sales, utility, and 
excise taxes. This would surely produce data that would grab people’s 
attention. We already know from accountability campaigns in states 
such as Connecticut and New Jersey that many big companies there 
pay tiny amounts of income tax—as little as $200 a year, far less than 
low-income families—thanks to gimmicks like the Delaware royalty 
loophole. 
If taxpayers learned that large companies in their state were paying 
almost no income tax, they would demand to know why. Indeed, a 1986 
revelation by Citizens for Tax Justice that many huge corporations were 
paying zero federal income tax was memorialized in the famous poster: 
“I pay more income tax than General Electric, W.R. Grace, General Dy-
namics, Boeing, Dow Chemical, and Lockheed All Put Together!”
The ensuing outrage prompted a major progressive reform, closing 
some corporate loopholes; the 1986 law is considered the best thing to 
happen to the federal tax code in decades. There is a large body of evi-
dence from both state-specifi c and national studies that companies are 
gaming state income tax codes even harder than Uncle Sam’s. For ex-
ample, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities points out that in the 
second half of the 1990s, when the U.S. economy was sizzling, federal 
corporate income tax revenues grew an average of 6 percent a year. But 
state corporate income tax collections rose at just half that rate. Same 
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companies, same profi ts, same years, half the tax (Mazerov 2003, p. 3). 
Combined reporting would solve much of that. 
REFORM 3: CLAWBACKS OR MONEY-BACK GUARANTEES
A clawback rule or contract simply says that a company must hold 
up its end of the bargain, otherwise taxpayers have some money-back 
protection. Eighteen states and dozens of cities already use clawbacks, 
which basically after a company gets a subsidy (say, two years later), it 
must create a certain number of jobs at a certain wage and benefi t level. 
The clawback may also require other public benefi ts such as a certain 
number of dollars invested to modernize a facility. Then, if the com-
pany does not meet the targets, taxpayers get paid back. The rule can be 
prorated so that, for example, if the company falls 10 percent short, it 
has to pay back 10 percent of the subsidy; it can also be set for a steeper 
penalty, if the company falls far short. 
I can hear the business lobbyists wailing again about poisoning the 
“business climate.” But I think just the opposite is true. From the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a string of lawsuits in which cities 
tried to get subsidy money back from companies that were shutting 
plants (Chicago v. Hasbro/Playskool; Norwood, Ohio v. General Mo-
tors; Duluth v. Triangle; Yonkers v. Otis Elevator; Ypsilanti Township v. 
General Motors). The latter is best known: Ypsilanti Township alleged 
that statements made by GM in public hearings amounted to an oral 
contract obligating the company to stay in exchange for huge property 
tax breaks. 
Now, given the prevailing business climate dogma, these lawsuits 
were huge events, with mayors risking their cities’ reputations for be-
ing friendly to business. The lawsuits speak to incredible frustration 
and anger, even desperation. If the cities had negotiated clawbacks with 
the companies, it’s unlikely that there would have been any lawsuits. 
The companies’ obligations would have been spelled out in black and 
white—just like any private-sector contract—and there would likely 
never have been a dispute. Clear obligations on both sides of the table 
and no litigation: isn’t that a good business climate?
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REFORM 4: JOB QUALITY STANDARDS
Why give a company a subsidy and then allow it to pay a pov-
erty wage? Subsidizing low-wage jobs only means taxpayers get stuck 
with even higher, hidden costs—in the form of Food Stamps, Medicaid, 
Earned Income Tax Credit, and housing assistance. Thanks to the liv-
ing wage movement—and to good old common sense—this reform is 
already taking root. As of our last updated survey, at least 43 states, 41 
cities, and 5 counties now attach wage and/or health care requirements 
to economic development incentives (Purinton 2003).
I hasten to add that while these numbers have risen sharply since I 
began surveying for them in 1989, we still have a long way to go. Most 
jurisdictions still only apply these rules to one program (we found a 
total of 165, including 107 state rules) but if the 50 states have an aver-
age of 30 or more subsidies each, or a total of at least 1,500, that means 
about 93 percent of state subsidies still allow companies to pay as little 
as that Dairy Queen in Caledonia, Minnesota.
REFORM 5: UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS
About 35 states publish what is called a tax expenditure budget. 
That is, they provide the legislature with a report that says the state 
lost X dollars in revenue to A, B, and C tax credits. But most of these 
reports are incomplete or unreliable. Incredibly, there is no standard-
ized national set of accounting rules or guidelines for the states to track 
these expenses. (A group called the Government Finance Offi cers As-
sociation, which is the largest professional association of state and local 
treasurers and comptrollers, formed a committee to study the issue of 
subsidies in the late 1980s, but its work never went anywhere. The Gov-
ernment Accounting Standards Board, which sets guidelines for how 
governments should keep their books, has no fi rm rules telling states 
how to account for tax expenditures.)
This is a big issue because tax expenditures for economic develop-
ment (i.e., companies claiming corporate income tax credits or sales or 
utility tax exemptions that remain undisclosed) often dwarf other forms 
up07amritcCh.8.indd   190 4/11/2008   10:45:10 AM
Nine Concrete Ways to Curtail the Economic War among the States   191
of spending such as grants that do show up clearly in budgets because 
they require appropriations. It’s no exaggeration to call appropriations 
the top of the iceberg and tax expenditures the bottom. So most state 
legislatures are fl ying in the dark when it comes to the big picture. They 
don’t know how big the bottom of the iceberg is, much less what they 
are getting for it. 
The solution is a unifi ed development budget, as advocated for by 
groups in Texas, California, North Carolina, and Illinois. A unifi ed de-
velopment budget provides legislators with a comprehensive inventory 
of all forms of spending for economic development, including all the 
tax breaks as well as all the appropriations. Illinois enacted a unifi ed 
development budget requirement as part of its disclosure law in 2003, 
but the fi rst such budget issued by the state was very incomplete. In 
other states, research groups have cobbled together their own versions, 
a tedious exercise requiring a lot of budget sleuthing. 
Although there is not yet much experience with this safeguard, the 
idea is sound. Give taxpayers and lawmakers a document that puts the 
whole iceberg on the table every year or two. A document that treats tax 
breaks no differently than appropriations, that portrays them both cor-
rectly as simply different forms of the same thing: state spending. And 
then let people decide if they have the right balance. Chances are, with 
an accurate mapping of the whole iceberg, more people will turn their 
attention to the previously hidden bottom part, the secretive tax breaks, 
where most of the money is. Especially in times of budget defi cits and 
fi scal strain, there is a better chance that legislators will look at both the 
top and the bottom as they seek to balance their budgets.
REFORM 6: SCHOOL BOARD INPUT ON ABATEMENTS 
AND TIF
As Good Jobs First documented in 2003, only two states effectively 
shield school funding from revenue losses caused by property tax abate-
ments and revenue diversions caused by tax increment fi nancing (TIF). 
A few states give school boards limited input, but the great majority 
give school boards no say in the process (Good Jobs First 2003). It’s a 
big issue for school fi nance; although local revenue sources for schools 
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are less important than they used to be, as states play a greater role, 
property taxes remain the largest single source of funding for K-12, and 
in some states, they still account for more than half. But with 43 states 
allowing abatements and 48 using TIF, the threat to school funding is 
present in every state. 
It’s crazy public policy when you think about it: voters elect mem-
bers of the school board and expect them to meet their obligation to 
educate the kids. But then along comes a city council or a county board 
doling out abatements or TIF, eating the school board’s lunch. Call it an 
inter-governmental free lunch. Can you imagine the opposite happen-
ing: school boards unilaterally grabbing chunks of the budget for police 
and fi re services? 
Protecting education funding matters doubly for economic devel-
opment. Good schools are a key amenity that help cities attract and re-
tain good employers, especially those that require highly skilled (read: 
well-paid) workers. And with the baby boom generation approaching 
retirement, the growth rate of the U.S. labor force is plummeting, sug-
gesting that we may face chronic skilled labor shortages. For both these 
reasons, the states and regions with good schools will be the economic 
development winners of the twenty-fi rst century.
School boards should have a full voting seat on any board that abates 
or diverts property tax revenue away from schools. And school boards 
should have veto power over that portion of property tax that would be 
lost to the schools in each specifi c abatement or TIF deal. 
REFORM 7: A FEDERAL “CARROT” AGAINST JOB PIRACY
The federal government often uses the power of its purse as a “car-
rot” to entice the states to reform their programs. A fraction of federal 
highway funding was held back from states until they raised their legal 
drinking age to 21. The No Child Left Behind Act uses federal funds to 
encourage school reform (though many doubt its effectiveness). 
There is no reason the same idea could not apply to economic de-
velopment. Ten percent of a state’s money from the U.S. Departments 
of Commerce and Labor could be held back until a state adopted cer-
tain reforms. Just a few strategic ones would suffi ce: a certifi cation by 
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the governor that the state will not use taxpayer dollars to pirate jobs 
from another state, and adoption of disclosure and a unifi ed develop-
ment budget.
REFORM 8: PROPERLY DEFINE SITE LOCATION 
CONSULTANTS AS LOBBYISTS
Miriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defi nes lobbying as “to at-
tempt or infl uence or sway (as a public offi cial) towards a desired ac-
tion.” That sure sounds like the work of a site location consultant to me, 
since the deals they orchestrate routinely involve the passage of local 
ordinances for property tax abatements, industrial revenue bonds and/or 
zoning, and bigger deals sometimes involve state legislation as well. 
Site location consultants work both sides of the street; that is, they 
work for companies looking for places and places looking for com-
panies. It is an apparent confl ict of interest that allows them to profi t 
by controlling the key information about a deal. It’s like a trial lawyer 
who represents children who got cancer from a nearby chemical plant 
also working for the chemical company. Or better yet, like a blackjack 
dealer who knows what your down card is. 
Somehow, site location consultants have come to occupy a space 
where they defy norms about professional ethics and the proper repre-
sentation of opposing parties. Let’s be clear: there are opposing interests 
at play here. Companies want to pick the public pocket for every dime 
they can get, and public offi cials (or at least most of them) are trying 
to land the deal while spending as little as possible. But the bargaining 
table is sloped sharply because the site location consultant controls all 
of the information between the company and the sites competing for 
the deal. And in some cases, the site location consultant has a monetary 
self-interest in upping the ante of subsidies because he is working on 
commission of up to 30 percent of the value of those subsidies. 
To help remedy this, states ought to legally classify site location con-
sultants as lobbyists. In many states, that would require them to disclose 
at least a little about their activities. More importantly, it would block 
them from receiving success fees (read: commissions) and thereby re-
move their most outrageous incentive to fuel the candy-store arms race.
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The long-term objective here is to split the profession into two. 
Site location consulting ought to consist of fi sh and fowl, i.e., consul-
tants who work for companies and others who work for cities, counties, 
and states. There should be a robust, adversarial process in which the 
taxpayers benefi t from a side of the profession that specializes in ag-
gressive bargaining, professional cost-benefi t analysis, and cold market 
judgments about corporate behavior. 
REFORM 9: PROMOTE SMART GROWTH AND CURTAIL 
THE “ECONOMIC WAR AMONG THE SUBURBS”
In some respects, the “war among the states” alarm is misleading. 
Far more common than state versus state competitions for deals like 
the Boeing 7E7 are deals in which two or three jurisdictions within 
the same metro area compete for a deal. Indeed, when we looked at 29 
subsidized corporate relocations in the Twin Cities metro area, only one 
company had even considered locating just across the state line in Wis-
consin. Most relocating companies cannot afford to move to another 
state; they want to retain their workforces, and stay close to their cus-
tomers and suppliers. They simply need more space or a better location 
within the same metro area. 
The state versus state competitions tend to be more high-profi le, 
such as those involving new auto assembly plants, so many people are 
unaware that intraregional competition is far more common. Only four 
states—Connecticut, Ohio, Minnesota, and Maine—collect informa-
tion about subsidized relocations as part of their disclosure systems, 
and none has ever analyzed the data. To their credit, local development 
offi cials in some regions, by informal arrangements, seek to deter the 
use of subsidies to pay for relocations within their areas. 
States should deny subsidies altogether to retail deals (except in 
truly depressed inner-city markets that are demonstrably underserved, 
such as those that lack basic retail items such as groceries, medications, 
and clothes). Retail is not economic development; it is what happens 
when people have disposable income. (It has lousy upstream ripple ef-
fects—all those goods from China—and paltry downstream ripple ef-
fects, since retail jobs are overwhelmingly part time, low wage, and 
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without health care.) And big-box retail, which has become so expert 
at mongering subsidies, undermines existing retailers and is a primary 
cause of abandonment of urban core areas and the loss of open space at 
the suburban fringe.
States should also repeal point-of-sale sales tax collection rules. 
That is, they should not allow the city where a retail sale occurs to 
collect any share of the tax. Allowing one suburb to build a mall that 
pirates sales tax revenue from the core city and dozens of surrounding 
suburbs simply undermines the tax base of older areas. And it creates a 
perverse incentive for another suburb to build yet another mall further 
out, and so the leap-frog sprawl continues. For the same reason, those 
states that allow sales tax to be “TIFed” should repeal it; that just puts 
the perverse incentive on steroids. In today’s sprawling metro areas, 
people live in one jurisdiction, work in another, and shop in a few oth-
ers. Sales tax revenues ought to be shared statewide and regionally, 
refl ecting that reality. 
In metro areas, states should explicitly link economic development 
to public transportation, so that in order to get a subsidy, the project must 
be accessible by transit (i.e., within a quarter of a mile of a regularly 
served transit stop). That would reduce companies’ abilities to whipsaw 
suburbs against each other (by taking exclusionary suburbs out of the 
race), steer more jobs onto the transit system, help low-income families 
gain access to more jobs, give more commuters a choice about how to 
get to work, and improve air quality. In a 50-state survey, we found that 
not a single state effectively coordinates any of its subsidy programs 
with public transit, even though the average state now has more than 30 
subsidies. It is a huge wasted opportunity for transportation dollars to 
leverage smart growth, since states spend fi ve times more on economic 
development than on public transportation (Khan 2003). In 2006, the 
Illinois legislature passed a “location effi cient incentives” bill, which 
the governor signed into law. Illinois thus became the fi rst state to in-
tentionally make such a link, giving a slightly larger state tax credit to 
deals located close to transit and/or affordable housing. 
Finally, states should deny development subsidies (as Maryland 
does under its Smart Growth Act) to any kind of deal that is not located 
in an area that already has infrastructure. Making developers bear the 
full infrastructure cost of sprawling fringe development helps tip the 
scales in favor of urban reinvestment. If land use policies bring jobs and 
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tax bases back to older areas, the need for subsidies to revitalize those 
areas will diminish.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE “BUSINESS CLIMATE”
I can hear the business lobbyists howling already. “This is inva-
sion of taxpayer privacy. This will threaten small businesses. This will 
poison the business climate,” they’re crying. Well, to them, I say three 
things.
First, there is no evidence that any of the 12 states cited here have 
harmed their business climates by having disclosure. (Nor, for that mat-
ter, is there evidence that any state has hurt its business climate with any 
other kind of reform I have cited, such as wage rules or money-back 
guarantee clawbacks.) As the person who has been out there publicizing 
these safeguards for 12 years, I think I would have been presented with 
such evidence if there was any, and I have not.
Second, nothing proposed here will invade anyone’s privacy or 
harm any small businesses. By disclosure, I am not talking about public 
release of any companies’ state income tax returns. I am not talking 
about seeing a company’s profi ts or losses, nor am I talking about dis-
closure of how much most companies paid in state income tax. But I 
do think that as a taxpayer, I ought to have the right to see how much 
a company claimed on a tax credit. Because when a company claims a 
credit and pays less income tax, it is the same thing as if the government 
wrote a check to the company for some other economic development 
purpose, like a training grant. When a company claims an income tax 
credit, it means the company is paying less for public services and I 
have to pay more. I want to know how much more.
Third, lots of other kinds of tax breaks and subsidies are already pub-
lic information. If a company gets a property tax abatement, I can see 
the details at the county tax assessor’s offi ce. If a company got a training 
grant, I can get that fi le at the Workforce Investment Board. If a company 
got a low-interest industrial revenue bond, I can go the county industrial 
development authority and get that information. Why should income tax 
credits be treated any differently? They were sold to us as “jobs, jobs, 
jobs,” so we should be able to see how much those jobs are costing. 
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Notes
A more detailed version of the remedies discussed here was published in LeRoy (2005).
 1.  In May 2006, in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing in federal court to contest a state investment tax credit 
that a lower court had ruled unconstitutional. In a separate ruling, the Supreme 
Court upheld a ruling by the same lower court that a property tax abatement was 
constitutional.
References
Good Jobs First. 2003. “Protecting Public Education from Tax Giveaways 
to Corporations: Property Tax Abatements, Tax Increment Financing, and 
Funding for Schools.” National Education Association Working Paper, Jan-
uary. Washington, DC: National Education Association.
Khan, Mafruza. 2003. Missing the Bus: How States Fail to Connect Economic 
Development with Public Transit. Washington, DC: Good Jobs First. http://
www.goodjobsfi rst.org/pdf/bus.pdf (acessed December 18, 2006).  
LeRoy, Greg. 2004. No More Candy Store: States and Cities Making Subsidies 
Accountable. Washington, DC: Good Jobs First. 
———. 2005. The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax Dodging and 
the Myth of Job Creation. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Mazerov, Michael. 2003. Closing Three Common Corporate Income Tax Loop-
holes Could Raise Additional Revenue for Many States. Washington, DC: 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. http://www.cbpp.org/4-9-02sfp.htm 
(accessed December 18, 2006).
Purinton, Anna. 2003. The Policy Shift to Good Jobs: States, Cities and Coun-
ties Attaching Job Quality Standards to Economic Development Subsi-
dies. Washington, DC: Good Jobs First. http://www.goodjobsfi rst.org/pdf/
jobquality.pdf (accessed December 18, 2006). 
up07amritcCh.8.indd   197 4/11/2008   10:45:11 AM





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Markusen.indb   3 2/27/2007   12:39:58 PM
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Reining in the competition for capital / Ann Markusen, editor.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-295-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-295-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-296-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-296-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Capital movements. 2. Capital market. 3. Fiscal policy. 4. Competition, 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Markusen.indb   4 2/27/2007   12:39:58 PM
